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A Unied Model of Spatial Price Discrimination
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Abstract
We present a general model of mixed oligopoly, where competing rms exercise spatial price dis-
crimination. Our ndings indicate that the Nash equilibrium locations of rms are always socially
optimal irrespective of the number of competitors, the level of privatization, the form of the trans-
portation costs and the number and/or the varieties of the produced goods. An immediate implication
of this result is that this form of competition is preferable from a welfare point of view.
JEL classication: L13; L32; L33; R32
Keywords: Mixed oligopoly; Social optimality; Spatial competition; Di¤erentiated goods
1 Introduction
De Fraja and Delbono (1989) initiated a large literature on mixed oligopoly, where public and private
rms coexist in the same market.1 The existing studies can be classied as falling into two groups; one
adopting a restricted binaryapproach where rms are either private or public (e.g., Cremer et al., 1991;
Matsumura and Matsushima, 2003; Lu, 2006) and the other allowing for partially privatized rms (e.g.,
Matsumura, 1998; Fershtman, 1990; Bennett and Maw, 2003; Kumar and Saha, 2008).
Mixed oligopoly, however, has rarely been examined within the context of spatial price discrimination
introduced by Hoover (1937) and Lerner and Singer (1937). This type of spatial competition di¤ers from
the one introduced by Hotelling (1929) in the fact that the rms do not compete in mill prices but instead
bear transportation costs and set delivered price schedules.2 Notable exceptions, where mixed oligopoly
theory accounts for spatial price discrimination, are those of Heywood and Ye (2009a, b) and Beladi et al.
(2014). Nevertheless, the aforementioned studies impose too many restrictions in their modeling structure,
such as the number of competing rms, the form of the transportation cost function and the attributes /
Department of Economics, University of Piraeus, 80 Karaoli & Dimitriou Street, Piraeus 185 34, Greece. E-mail:
kostasel@otenet.gr (Eleftheriou); njm@unipi.gr (Michelacakis).
yCorresponding author. Tel: +30 210 4142282; Fax: +30 210 4142346
1For a comprehensive review about mixed oligopoly literature, see De Fraja (2009).
2Applications of spatial price discrimination can be found in Lederer and Hurter (1986), Hamilton et al. (1989), Hamilton
et al. (1991), McLeod et al. (1992), Braid (2008), and Vogel (2011). Anderson et al. (1992) present an overview of the
related literature.
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number of goods in the market. It is not at all clear how these restrictions a¤ect the nature of results. For
example, dAspremont et al. (1979) showed that in the traditional Hotellings model (Hotelling, 1929),
the nature of travel costs is important for the existence of an equilibrium. Surprisingly enough, they
showed that an equilibrium exists when transportation costs are proportional to the square of distance
while it doesnt when the travel costs are linear. On the other hand, Cremer et al. (1991) highlighted the
importance of the number of rms on the welfare properties of the equilibrium.
The present paper contributes to the existing literature in manifold ways. We show that in a model
of mixed oligopoly with spatial price discrimination, where the produced goods have the same reservation
value for the buyers, the market outcome will be socially optimal, and this result is independent of the
number of rms in the market, the level of privatization of each rm, the form of the transportation cost
function and the number and/or the varieties of the goods o¤ered by each competitor. The driving force
behind our results is the same as in Lederer and Hurter (1986); a rm can increase its prot by opting
for a production location so as to decrease the total cost of all rms in the market.3 However, in Lederer
and Hurter (1986) competition is restricted to only two exclusively privately owned rms, therefore, mixed
oligopoly and the ensuing welfare questions are not being considered. It should also be observed that the
results in Beladi et al. (2014) can be obtained as a special case of our model, with two rms, three varieties
of the same good (or three goods) and linear transportation costs.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the benchmark model where
rms o¤er a homogeneous good. The mixed oligopoly with multiple goods is analyzed in Section 3. Section
4 concludes.
2 The benchmark model
We consider a market consisted of n rms and a continuum of consumers uniformly distributed over the
unit interval [0; 1] of a linear country.4 Let xi, i = 1; :::; n, denote the location of rm i in the interval [0; 1]
with 0  x1 < x2 < ::: < xn  1. All rms produce and sell the same homogeneous good. The fraction
of consumers buying this good is equal to c 2 (0; 1]. Each consumer buys one unit of the good from the
lowest price rm, providing that this price is lower or equal to her reservation price (i.e., the maximum
price that the consumers are willing to pay for the good), m > 0. The marginal costs of production are
constant and, without any loss of generality, are set equal to 0. Spatial price discrimination à la Lerner and
3This implies the alignment of the social and private optima.
4By uniformly distributed, we mean that the proportion of consumers buying the good remains the same, regardless of
the subinterval of [0; 1].
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Singer (1937) is assumed, where Nash equilibrium in delivered price schedules exists. More specically,
the price charged for the good by the rm that is closer to the consumer is equal to (or innitesimally
less than) the delivered cost of the neighboring rm which is further away.5 Because marginal production
costs have been normalized to 0, delivered costs coincide with transportation costs. Transportation cost is
measured through a function f of the shipped distance d, with f non-negative, increasing and continuous.
The aggregate transportation (shipping) cost6 for all locations z of consumers who buy from any of the n
rms is equal to
T (x1; :::; xn) =
nX
i=1
Ti(x1; :::; xn) (1)
where
Ti(x1; :::; xn) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
c
R x1
0
f(x1   z)dz +
R x1+x2
2
x1
f(z   x1)dz

for i = 1
c
R xi
xi 1+xi
2
f(xi   z)dz +
R xi+xi+1
2
xi
f(z   xi)dz

for 1 < i < n
c
R xn
xn 1+xn
2
f(xn   z)dz +
R 1
xn
f(z   xn)dz

for i = n
(2)
is the total transportation cost for those consumers buying from rm i.
Firm i is selling its product at a price matching (or which is innitesimally less than) the delivery cost
of its direct competitor7 which is the rm nearest to its location. Thus, the prot function of rm i is
5e.g., the neighboring rms for rm i, are rms i  1 and i+ 1.
6The terms delivered cost, transportation cost, and shipping costare used interchangeably hereafter.
7We assume that this cost does not exceed the reservation value of the consumer.
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i(x1; :::; xn) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
c
R x1
0
[f(x2   z)  f(x1   z)]dz +
R x1+x2
2
x1
[f(x2   z)  f(z   x1)]dz

if i = 1
c
0BBBB@
R xi
xi 1+xi
2
[f(z   xi 1)  f(xi   z)]dz
+
R xi 1+xi+1
2
xi
[f(z   xi 1)  f(z   xi)]dz
+
R xi+xi+1
2
xi 1+xi+1
2
[f(xi+1   z)  f(z   xi)]dz
1CCCCA if 1 < i < n and xi  xi 1+xi+12
c
0BBBB@
R xi 1+xi+1
2
xi 1+xi
2
[f(z   xi 1)  f(xi   z)]dz
+
R xi
xi 1+xi+1
2
[f(xi+1   z)  f(xi   z)]dz
+
R xi+xi+1
2
xi
[f(xi+1   z)  f(z   xi)]dz
1CCCCA if 1 < i < n and xi 1+xi+12  xi
c
0@ R xnxn 1+xn2 [f(z   xn 1)  f(xn   z)]dz
+
R 1
xn
[f(z   xn 1)  f(z   xn)]dz
1A if i = n
(3)
.
Lemma 1 The marginal transportation cost is
@Ti=@xi =
8>>><>>>:
c

f(x1)  12f(x2 x12 )

for i = 1
c

1
2
f(xi xi 1
2
)  1
2
f(xi+1 xi
2
)

for 1 < i < n
c

1
2
f(xn xn 1
2
)  f(1  xn)

for i = n
:
Proof. Let F (y) :=
R
f(y)dy, then Ti(x1; :::; xn) = c

[ F (xi   z)]xixi 1+xi
2
+ [F (z   xi)]
xi+xi+1
2
xi

=
c
 2F (0) + F (xi xi 1
2
) + F (xi+1 xi
2
)

. Hence, @Ti=@xi = c

1
2
f(xi xi 1
2
)  1
2
f(xi+1 xi
2
)

. Similarly, we can
show that @T1=@x1 = c

f(x1)  12f(x2 x12 )

and @Tn=@xn = c

1
2
f(xn xn 1
2
)  f(1  xn)

.
Maintaining the notation as above, we can state the rst of the two main results of this section.
Proposition 1 The marginal aggregate transportation cost with respect to the location of rm i, i = 1; :::; n,
is opposite to the marginal prot of rm i, i.e.
@T=@xi =  @i=@xi:
Proof. For 1 < i < n, xi appears in the expression of the aggregate transportation cost in the following
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fashion:
T (x1; :::; xn) = T1(x1; :::; xn) + :::+ c
 Z xi 1
xi 2+xi 1
2
f(xi 1   z)dz +
Z xi 1+xi
2
xi 1
f(z   xi 1)dz
!
| {z }
Ti 1
+Ti(x1; :::; xn) + c
 Z xi+1
xi+xi+1
2
f(xi+1   z)dz +
Z xi+1+xi+2
2
xi+1
f(z   xi+1)dz
!
| {z }
Ti+1
+
:::+ Tn(x1; :::; xn)
From the above expression and Lemma 1, we get
@T
@xi
= c

f(
xi   xi 1
2
)  f(xi+1   xi
2
)

for 1 < i < n. In view of the notation F (y) :=
R
f(y)dy, we rewrite (3), for xi 1+xi+1
2
 xi and 1 < i < n,
i(x1; :::; xn) = c

2F (
xi+1   xi 1
2
)  2F (xi   xi 1
2
)  2F (xi+1   xi
2
) + 2F (0)

Di¤erentiating the above expression, we get
@i
@xi
= c

 f(xi   xi 1
2
) + f(
xi+1   xi
2
)

Proposition 1 together with the fact that @T=@xi = @Ti=@xi imply
Corollary 1 The marginal prot of rm i, i = 1; :::; n, with respect to its location xi (@i=@xi) is opposite
to its marginal transportation cost (@Ti=@xi).
The next step is to compare the Nash equilibrium locations with the socially optimal ones. To derive
the socially optimal locations we have to minimize (1) with respect to each rms location. Hence, the
socially optimal locations satisfy the system:
@T=@xi = 0; i = 1; :::; n: (4)
On the other hand, the Nash equilibrium locations are given by the solution of the following system:
@i=@xi = 0; i = 1; :::; n: (5)
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From Proposition 1, we get that systems (4) and (5) are equivalent and therefore have the same solution.
This leads us to the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 In models of spatial price discrimination à la Lerner and Singer, where rms have constant
marginal production costs, produce the same homogeneous good and consumers are distributed uniformly
along a linear country of unit length, the Nash equilibrium locations of rms are socially optimal.
In our analysis so far, all rms are privately owned. Let us now assume that single rm l, l = f1; :::; ng
is partly privately owned and partly publicly owned in proportions al and 1  al (in other words al can be
considered as the degree of privatization), respectively with al 2 [0; 1]. In such a case, rm l will decide
about its optimal location by maximizing the weighted average of its own prots and social welfare with
weights al and 1  al, respectively. Social welfare is equal to the sum of the aggregate prots (the prot of
all rms) and consumerssurplus. The consumerssurplus is given by
CS(x1; :::; xn) =
nX
i=1
CSi(x1; :::; xn) (6)
where CSi(x1; :::; xn) is the consumer surplus generated for the consumers buying from rm i, therefore,
CSi(x1; :::; xn) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
c
R x1
0
[m  f(x2   z)]dz +
R x1+x2
2
x1
[m  f(x2   z)]dz

for i = 1
c
0BBBB@
R xi
xi 1+xi
2
[m  f(z   xi 1)]dz
+
R xi 1+xi+1
2
xi
[m  f(z   xi 1)]dz
+
R xi+xi+1
2
xi 1+xi+1
2
[m  f(xi+1   z)]dz
1CCCCA for xi  xi 1+xi+12 and 1 < i < n
c
0BBBB@
R xi 1+xi+1
2
xi 1+xi
2
[m  f(z   xi 1)]dz
+
R xi
xi 1+xi+1
2
[m  f(xi+1   z)]dz
+
R xi+xi+1
2
xi
[m  f(xi+1   z)]dz
1CCCCA for xi 1+xi+12  xi and 1 < i < n
c
R xn
xn 1+xn
2
[m  f(z   xn 1)]dz +
R 1
xn
[m  f(z   xn 1)]dz

for i = n
(7)
Direct calculation proves
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Lemma 2 i(x1; :::; xn)+ CSi(x1; :::; xn) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
R x1+x2
2
0
mdz   T1(x1; :::; xn) for i = 1
R xi+xi+1
2
xi 1+xi
2
mdz   Ti(x1; :::; xn) for 1 < i < n
R 1
xn 1+xn
2
mdz   Tn(x1; :::; xn) for i = n
Proof. Straightforward direct calculations.
Summing up over all rms one gets the following Proposition which could be viewed as the second main
result of this section.
Proposition 3
nX
i=1
i(x1; :::; xn) + CS(x1; :::; xn) = m  T (x1; :::; xn)
Proof. Straightforward direct calculations.
The prot function of the partly publicly owned rm l will be
^l(x1; :::; xn) = l(x1; :::; xn) + (1  al)
"X
i6=l
i(x1; :::; xn) + CS(x1; :::; xn)
#
(8)
where l would be the prot function of rm l if it were fully privately owned.
Proposition 4 Nash equilibria remain socially optimal regardless of the degree of privatization of the
individual rms i; 1  i  n.
Proof. Fix a random i; 1  i  n. Using Proposition 3 and (8), we get
^l(x1; :::; xn) = l(x1; :::; xn) + (1  al) [m  T (x1; :::; xn)  l(x1; :::; xn)]
From Proposition 1
@T=@xl =  @l=@xl ()  @T=@xl   @l=@xl = 0
which implies that @^l=@xl = @l=@xl. Induction on i completes the proof.
3 The case of multiple goods
We now assume the existence of L di¤erent goods or di¤erent varieties of the same good or both. Let kj
denote the number of rms producing good j, j = 1; :::; L with 1  kj  n. Let T j denote the aggregate
7
transportation cost related to the provision of good j and ji the corresponding prot of rm i from selling
good j with ji = 0 if good j is not produced by rm i. Let further ~T =
LP
j=1
T j be the aggregate shipping
cost for all products and ~i =
LP
j=1
ji the total prot of rm i for all products it produces. The fraction of
consumers buying product j is cj 2 (0; 1] uniformly spread over [0; 1] with
LP
j=1
cj = 1. In the case where
good j is produced by only one rm, then this rm enjoys monopoly privileges and charges a price equal
to, or innitesimally smaller than, the reservation price mj, i.e. the maximum price the consumer is willing
to pay for good j. A fundamental assumption in this multi-good setting is that m1 = ::: = mL = m (i.e.
the reservation price is common for all goods).8
Proposition 5 The marginal aggregate shipping cost for all products with respect to the location of rm i
is opposite to the marginal prot of rm i for all products it produces, namely @ ~T=@xi =   @ ~i=@xi.
Proof. From Proposition 1, we get that for every product j o¤ered by more than one rm
@T j=@xi =  @ji=@xi
It can be easily shown that the above condition holds even if product j is produced by only one rm (i.e.
the rm is a monopoly for good j). To complete the proof we sum up over all products.
Theorem 1 In models of spatial price discrimination à la Lerner and Singer, where rms have constant
marginal production costs, produce di¤erent combination of goods, consumers are distributed uniformly
along a linear city of unit length and have the same reservation price for all goods, the Nash equilibrium
locations of rms are socially optimal.
Proof. To derive the socially optimal locations we have to minimize ~T with respect to each rms
location. Hence, the socially optimal locations satisfy the following system of equations:
@ ~T=@xi = 0; i = 1; :::; n: (9)
On the other hand, the Nash equilibrium locations are given by the solution of the following system:
@ ~i=@xi = 0; i = 1; :::; n: (10)
8It should be noted that this assumption is more realistic in the case of the di¤erent varieties of the same good and less
in the case of di¤erent goods.
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Because of Proposition 5, systems (9) and (10) are equivalent. It follows that they must have the same set
of solutions.
Lets now turn to the case where some rms are partly privately owned and partly publicly owned.
Keeping the notation the same as in Section 2, l =
LP
j=1
^jl is the prot of rm l where ^
j
l is the prot of
rm l from selling good j and ^jl = 0 if good j is not produced by rm l.
Theorem 2 The degree of privatization does not a¤ect the socially optimal Nash equilibrium locations.
Proof. From the analysis in the previous section it can be easily shown that @ l=@xl =
LP
j=1
(@^jl =@xl) =
LP
j=1
(@jl =@xl) = @
~l=@xl.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we prove that when rms exercise spatial price discrimination, the outcome of the mixed
oligopoly is socially optimal and independent from the underlying assumptions about the number of rms,
the level of privatization, the nature of transportation costs and the number or the varieties of the provided
goods. To the best of our knowledge, our analysis is the rst attempt to present an holisticview of the
mixed oligopoly theory under spatial price discrimination. While general in nature, our model is restricted
by the assumption of linear city/country. Therefore, examining the robustness of our ndings under a
two-dimensional spatial framework constitutes a topic for future research. In reality, the true task ahead
is to relax the framework to that of a two-dimensional Euclidean manifold where the locations of the n
rms with n > 2 are not on the same geodesic.
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